Recent events surrounding sanctions on Russia reveal complex political maneuvering in the US and the European Union. Despite repeated statements, actual introduction of new sanctions faces resistance and bargaining among leaders.
US President Donald Trump takes a transactional approach: he promises sweeping restrictions only if NATO countries stop buying Russian energy, an almost impossible condition. In Congress, there is no unified support for tougher sanctions. Republican senators are caught between the president's stance and the need for quick action on aid to Ukraine.
In the EU, the requirement for consensus allows individual states, notably Hungary and Slovakia, to block new sanction packages or extract concessions in exchange for their vote. These countries’ dependence on Russian gas heightens the challenge, and political will to exert serious economic pressure is weakening ahead of key European elections.
Despite numerous restrictions, Russia is adapting—redirecting trade flows, developing alternative supply routes for oil and gas via third countries. Furthermore, secondary sanctions, especially on China, would create serious economic risks for the sanctioning countries themselves.
The gap between rhetoric and practical implementation is weakening the effectiveness of sanctions. The West finds it difficult to achieve concrete results against aggression amid global trade and corporate interests. This growing divide raises doubts as to whether sanctions remain a principal deterrent tool.
